

# *Seeing Yourself From Your Enemy's Perspective*

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*OPFOR Observations  
of BLUFOR Performance*



# *Agenda*

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- **Intelligence**
- **Maneuver**
- **Fire Support**
- **Air Defense**
- **Mobility/Counter mobility/Survivability**
- **Combat Service Support**
- **Battle Command**



# *Intelligence*

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- You don't understand how we fight
  - Commanders and S-2s seem to expect a set piece fight; predictable order of battle and method of fighting vs. our *METT-T based* operations
  - You have little appreciation for the *flexibility* created in all our tactical operations or our determination to achieve *surprise*
  - Your IPB does not prepare the brigade task force to defeat multiple enemy courses of action and match our flexibility and agility



## *Intelligence (Continued)*

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- Based on ineffective fire support in most operations, your IPB does not set conditions for effective engagement of our high payoff targets, destructive/suppressive fires, or obscuration.
- Your S2s, FSOs, and FDOs are not working as a team to refine targets/fire support plans based on recon and surveillance reports
- You don't use your MI collection teams to confirm your SITEMP, help you see yourself from our perspective, or protect your force; most of our nets are still unsecure



# *Maneuver*

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- **Your reconnaissance forces/operations are usually ineffective**
  - **Given when and where recon assets are employed, both air and ground, your recon/surveillance plans do not provide commanders the ability to see through the depths of the battlefield, determine our course of action, track our forces, employ fire support, or destroy/disrupt our high-payoff targets. *The most serious warfighting deficiency we observe.***



## ***Maneuver(Continued)***

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- **Security forces/operations are usually ineffective**
  - **You establish a screen too late and array forces linearly with little depth; easy to penetrate**
  - **You position security forces without appreciation of how our air and ground recon forces use the terrain to move and infiltrate into OPs; ineffective IPB for security operations**
  - **You are easiest to penetrate about 0100-0400; poor sleep discipline and observation plans**



## *Maneuver(Continued)*

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- You don't maintain 360 degree observation of the battlefield during movement or during actions on contact; poor flank security during movement; usually vulnerable to flank/rear ambush
- You have few killer platoons or companies; very little volley fire; MILES gunnery and offensive/defensive direct fire planning skills are weak.
- You have not mastered the use of terrain to dominate the direct fire battle; ineffective use of intervisibility lines in schemes of maneuver



## *Maneuver(Continued)*

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- You bunch up during movement; easy target arrays; inadequate dispersion (200-300m/veh)
- You don't practice or use battle drills at small unit level; action on contact usually slow and ineffective
- Use of dismounted infantry is improving; the toughest opponent we face if employed at the right time on the right ground, with a supporting engineer and artillery effort.





# *Fire Support*

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- Synchronization of lethal and non-lethal fires with maneuver is usually ineffective; seldom see any focus of fires. Fire support has not influenced the outcome of battles for several months. Apparently, you don't have well-trained targeting teams or process in the bde.
- Kill the COLTs and the FIST teams and there will be no BLUFOR fire support--*your most serious vulnerability.*
- SEAD is usually ineffective, if conducted



## ***Fire Support (Continued)***

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- You emplace COLTS effectively, but they are easily DF'd and acquired; Usually no retrans to support FD1, nor do they seem to enjoy priority on FD nets in the fight.
- You seldom fire/emplace special munitions at the right time or place to achieve desired effects; observers and direct and indirect fires seldom integrated; again...no targeting process?
- Jamming is usually effective for short durations; seldom disruptive. Don't know when to jam for best effect



## ***Fire Support (Continued)***

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- **Q-36s easy to find; seldom execute survivability moves. *One of our high payoff targets.* Often seen moving at a time when counterfire protection is required; again...no evidence of a targeting team or process which synchronizes fire support with maneuver.**
- **FD1 digital net easy to acquire; few units frequency hop. *Another high payoff target and vulnerability we exploit.***



## *M/C/S*

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- **Delivery of mines and barrier material is slow. You lose a lot of time. Obstacle preparation usually incomplete and seldom in depth. Poor integration of obstacles with direct and indirect fires...little evidence of an integrated targeting process**
- **Lot of wasted dozer time**
- **Your breaching operations are poorly executed; ineffective synchronization of the combined arms team; seldom set conditions to breach before committing maneuver forces.**



## *M/C/S*

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- **FASCAM minefields are seldom covered by observers and direct or indirect fires**
- **Your reaction to persistent chemical is weak; crews in trailing forces seldom get the word; no actions are taken to preclude others from driving into the contaminated area.**



# *Air Defense*

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- **BFSV direct fire capability not fully exploited; either for air defense or security operations at night.**
- **AVENGERS are very effective against our rotary and fixed wing aircraft when properly positioned and alerted. Also a terrific security and surveillance asset at night.**
- **Your ability to template our likely LZs, position air defense systems to interdict our air insertions, or compel is to abort remains a weakness.**



# *Combat Service Support*

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- **Not fully observed, but....**
- **Your casualty evacuation is slow which seems to affect your ability to build combat power and prepare for combat.**
- **You have a serious problem with timely distribution of Class IV in defensive operations**
- **Refuel operations are effective**
- **You don't secure your CSS assets very well; usually vulnerable to ground and air attack**
- **Maintenance operations seldom sustain your combat power over 90%.**



# *Battle Command*

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- You seldom take risk at brigade and task force level; your courses of action are predictable; seldom consider or use all maneuver space/opportunities
- Your planning/rehearsal process does not set conditions for synchronization of the combined arms team; operations are usually piecemeal efforts.
- Given the absence of flexibility and agility during the fight, your commanders apparently don't cross talk laterally or vertically during execution





## *Battle Command (cont)*

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- **Very seldom do you defend in depth or retain the size of reserve that can strike a decisive blow.**
- **You seldom organize an attack formation which provides you more than 2 maneuver options or array maneuver formations in depth to achieve agility and flexibility.**
- **Most commanders do not position to see the battlefield and critical events or they cannot sustain communications with subordinate commanders; an inability to preserve synchronization of the combined arms team**



## *Battle Command (cont)*

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- **Given the apparent inability of commanders to maintain real time situational awareness of both the enemy and themselves, and what we observe or destroy, FM retrans is not employed effectively to sustain FM communications for Bde Cmd, Bde O/I, and FD1...critical to effective command and control on the battlefield. *Another one of our high payoff targets.***

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

**BLACKHORSE**

